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ABSTRACT

The existing democratization and peacebuilding literature often neglects the important
role the domestic realm plays in post-conflict peacebuilding. To explain why some post-conflict
peacebuilding operations have a greater likelihood of success than others, some scholars have
examined the impact of factors such as international coordination, external donor interest,
democratic sequencing, and hostility levels. This analysis focuses on domestic capacities for
building peace in the aftermath of civil conflict in order to systematically explore the
relationship between the domestic sphere and peacebuilding success. Using Sambanis and
Doyle’s (2006) peacebuilding triangle model, new local capacities indexes will be created and
tested.
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1
1. INTRODUCTION

The contemporary international community is plagued with a proliferation of intrastate
conflicts or civil wars, most densely located in regions termed “less developed.” As a result of
globalization, advanced technology, and the rise of terrorism, the destabilizing effects of
intrastate war have generated considerable great power interest. The academic community
has put forth substantial effort towards understanding and creating peacebuilding initiatives.1
Sambanis and Doyle’s (2000; 2006) peacebuilding triangle model has become a central theory
within the existing literature on post-conflict peacebuilding. Three “concept” variables
compose the peacebuilding triangle, or the political space available for building peace –
international capacity, local capacity, and level of hostility, with international capacity
compensating for lower levels of local capacity and/or higher levels of hostility (Sambanis and
Doyle 2006). In contrast to Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) interest in the contribution of UN
peace operations to post-conflict peacebuilding success, this analysis is focused on exploring
the relationship between local capacities and peacebuilding success. The goal of this analysis is
to show how exploring the dimensions of post-conflict local capacity can shed light on the
probability of peacebuilding success, in addition to offering insight into an often neglected
dimension of peacebuilding, the domestic realm.

The purpose of peacebuilding is to address the derivations of hostility and build local capacities
for non-violent conflict resolution, such as robust state institutions and widespread political
1

Since 1948 there have been 63 UN peace operations, over two thirds of which have been implemented since the
1990s.
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participation, during the aftermath of civil strife. Stated differently, the goal of peacebuilding is
to endow societies with the skills and mechanisms to prevent future conflicts from turning
violent. The phenomena explored in this analysis, namely, local capacity for post-conflict
peacebuilding, has valuable implications for both academics and policy-makers. Strengthening
our understanding of post-conflict local capacity enables the development and implementation
of successful peacebuilding initiatives. Furthermore, exploring the facets of post-conflict local
capacity may offer insight into the current debate concerning the sequencing of institutionbuilding and democratization by specifying an optimal model for operationalizing local capacity.
The existing literature on post-conflict peacebuilding generally overlooks or dilutes the
dynamics of the domestic realm. This analysis serves to systematically test domestic capacity
with respect to post-conflict peacebuilding.

Sambanis and Doyle’s (2000; 2006) peacebuilding triangle explores two main local capacities
models: an index of electricity consumption per capita (the chosen index) and a composite
index of per capita GDP, rate of growth of per capita GDP, and primary commodity exports as a
percent of GDP. The central research question posited in this analysis is how can the local
capacities index be improved in order to better capture the qualities of the domestic sphere
and better predict the likelihood of post-conflict peacebuilding success? How can these
domestic qualities be systematically tested? Moreover, what are the factors that influence the
local capacities level of post-conflict environments? According to the existing literature, how
should these factors influence the probability of post-conflict peacebuilding success? How can
these factors be operationalized?

3
2. THE PEACEBUILDING TRIANGLE MODEL

Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) identify three core dimensions of international peacebuilding;
peacebuilding strategies should all address the domestic sources of hostility, the local capacities
for change, and the extent to which international assistance is available to generate reform.
The peacebuilding triangle is an embodiment of these three dimensions – level of hostility, local
capacities, and international capacities – as a model of the effective capacity for building postconflict peace. The dimensions interact with each other allowing the model to be both
competitive – hostility level versus international and local capacities – and cooperative –
international capacities and local capacities (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). The model assumes
international capacities to be strictly positive following the assumption that international
assistance will only improve, not thwart, the likelihood of peacebuilding success (Doyle and
Sambanis 2000). Each of the three dimensions is measured as an individual index ranging from
zero to one (see Figure 1).

The logic of the model is straightforward. As a modern international concept, peacebuilding
success heavily depends on ample international and/or regional involvement. Sambanis and
Doyle (2006) constructed the peacebuilding triangle model for the purpose of deciphering the
influence of various types of UN peace operations (e.g. mediation missions, observer missions,
traditional peacekeeping missions, multidimensional peacekeeping missions, and peace
enforcement missions) during the post-war era. The hostility level captures the impact of the
depth of violence present during the civil war – the more pugnacious and numerous the
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factions – on the need for greater international assistance in order to build peace (Doyle and
Sambanis 2000). Accordingly, lower levels of hostility would require less international
assistance, resulting in a lower-intensity UN mission as the most appropriate option. The local
capacities level captures the degree of socioeconomic development present, or the need for
state reconstruction. Greater international assistance coincides with a greater need for state
reconstruction, or a higher-intensity UN mission. In sum, the aim of Sambanis and Doyle’s
(2000; 2006) peacebuilding triangle is to show how international assistance is central to
peacebuilding in general and more likely to be successful when it caters to the context of each
particular case.

Figure 1: The Peacebuilding Triangle

Although for some cases, such as El Salvador and Croatia, Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006)
peacebuilding model does accurately predict the probability of peacebuilding success, for other
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cases, the peacebuilding triangle is less accurate due to omitted variables. Sambanis and Doyle
(2006) note that the peacebuilding triangle in Congo (1960-1965) could have conceivably been
more accurate if the primary commodity exports variable captured the country’s high
dependence on natural resource rents. On the one hand, the peacebuilding triangle in
Cambodia (1975-1991) was unable to capture the Khmer Rouge’s principal source of revenue,
the timber trade. On the other hand, and equally problematic, the peacebuilding triangle in
Cyprus (1974) overestimates the country’s resource dependency. According to Sambanis and
Doyle (2006), the peacebuilding triangle in East Timor (1975-1999) likely overestimates the
local capacities level; the insufficient physical infrastructure and absence of human capital
present in post-conflict East Timor were not captured by the peacebuilding triangle. In sum,
the current local capacities index is unable to capture some vital domestic aspects, factors that
will likely improve the efficacy of the peacebuilding triangle model.

A related concern pertains to the distribution of Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) local capacities
index. The mean local capacities level is 0.095, half of the cases have a local capacities measure
of at or below 0.042, and three-fourths of the cases have a local capacities level of at or below
0.113. Although local capacities tend to be low in post-war settings, the lack of variance (0.023)
in the current local capacities index leaves little room to explore the effect of smaller domestic
changes on the probability of peacebuilding success. For instance, all three of Angola’s civil
wars have a local capacities measure greater than between one-quarter and one half of all of
the cases, meaning that, according to this index, Angola has greater domestic capacity for
building peace than over one-fourth to one-half of all post-war intrastate conflicts. Looking
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more closely, though, Angola’s domestic terrain is highly problematic for building peace:
dependency on natural resource rents, lootable resource endowment, religious dominance,
and no previous experience with political pluralism. Post-conflict Iraq (1985-1996) also
measures at a relatively high local capacities level; according to the current local capacities
index, Iraq had greater domestic capacity for building peace than approximately 90% of all the
cases. Adding dimensions to the local capacities index will induce greater variance in the index
and enable a more fruitful exploration of the effect of the domestic realm with respect to
building peace.

7
3. LOCAL CAPACITY FOR BUILDING PEACE

Local capacity refers to the domestic resources and aptitude available for building peace in a
country during the aftermath of civil war (Sambanis and Doyle 2006). On a basic level, personal
experience and opportunity shape the contours of the post-conflict terrain. Kalyvas (2006)
points out that local quarrels and private grudges often exist but do not usually ignite into
violence and civil war; determining which factors generate violence and which factors prevent
war is vital to building sustainable peace. Sambanis and Doyle (2006) define local capacity as
the domestic socioeconomic capacity for reform after the cessation of civil conflict: the greater
the existing level of local capacity, the lesser the need for outside support; the lower the level
of socioeconomic capacity, the greater the need for an expansive and multidimensional
international role. Stated differently, local capacity is a society’s ability to rebuild itself after
civil strife, taking into account the economic opportunity cost of returning to war (Sambanis
and Doyle 2006). When lucrative economic opportunities are accessible, the opportunity cost
of war goes up, which lowers the incentive for factions to wage war.

Local capacity is not just the domestic capacity for change but also the likelihood of, or capacity
for, civil conflict. This analysis conceptualizes local capacity as the need for domestic
reconstruction (e.g. socioeconomic capital and state infrastructure) as well as the extent to
which insurgent revenue sources are procurable (e.g. the probability of domestic internecine),
both of which are contingent on state power. State power will be included under the
socioeconomic endowment local capacities dimension. Additionally, local capacity refers to the
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existing domestic capacity for democratization; democratization is a fundamental aspect of
post-conflict peacebuilding. Although Sambanis and Doyle (2006) take into consideration the
economic opportunity cost of returning to war, the new conceptualization of local capacity
includes the broader category of civil war onset, the notion of state power, and propensity for
democratization, all three of which were not incorporated in Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006)
conceptualization of local capacity. These three dimensions – extant socioeconomic
endowment for building peace, capacity for intrastate conflict, and proclivity to
democratization – coalesce and create the dynamics of local capacity.

Socioeconomic Endowment
In many ways, state power can be thought of as the epicenter of peacebuilding. State power,
or the state’s capacity to broadcast authority across its territory, hinges on several factors: in
order to reach the rural periphery, states must have ample physical infrastructure (e.g. roads,
electricity lines, telephone or communication lines, etc.); building physical infrastructure
requires money; generating revenue predominantly depends on taxation (excluding the
theories on natural resource endowment and taxation); taxation tends to parallel greater
political accountability, which commonly corresponds with enhanced social services and a
better educated citizenry. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) reveal a significant relationship affixing
population dispersion and conflict risk, reflecting Herbst’s (2000) hypothesis postulating that
states with highly dispersed populations are less able to control its people and states with
condensed populations are more able to control its people. Serwer and Thomson (2007)
define state infrastructure as electricity, communications, and transportation, such as roads,
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railways, or telephone landlines. In a study examining the factors that influence the likelihood
of successful implementation of intrastate peace agreements, Stedman (2001) includes a
qualitative measure of collapsed state defined as the absence of state institutions and
capacity.2 Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that conditions that favor insurgency significantly
influence intrastate conflict risk. Central to this argument is the hypothesis that insurgents are
more likely to survive and flourish in environments where the state is weak, referring to the
state’s police and military capabilities, in addition to the broadcast of state institutions, do not
reach the rural domain (Fearon and Laitin 2003).3 Conditions that favor insurgency pertain to
the presence of rough terrain (lack of functional/paved roads), large rural populations, etc. This
analysis will use two proxies of state power – rural population density and percent urban
population – and will include state power as part of the socioeconomic local capacities
dimension. Although road density, communications density, or army size could also be
insightful proxies for state power, the current paucity of data prohibits their usage in this
analysis.4

Numerous arguments concerning socioeconomic capital and domestic internecine have been
adduced by academics. Both Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that
countries with high levels of per capita income and high levels of per capita income growth are
both significantly associated with a reduction in conflict risk. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) attest
2

Stedman (2001) includes collapsed state as one of eight factors that make peacebuilding difficult; the more
difficulty factors present, the more onerous peace implementation will be. Also, Stedman (2001) does not specify
precisely what defines state institutions and capacity.
3
Insurgents refer to small groups of lightly armed combatants that use guerrilla warfare from rural bases (Fearon
and Laitin 2003).
4
Road density or telephone landline density would be useful if they could be measured at the end year of each
conflict.
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that a higher level of economic development makes countries less conducive to rebellion.
Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) operationalize socioeconomic development with a
measure of male secondary education enrollment, which also proves to be highly significant.
For Fearon and Laitin (2003), economic development reduces conflict risk because more
developed countries have stronger states, and are therefore likely to have more state
infrastructure that extends state power to the rural periphery. In Walter’s (2004) study
exploring the factors that influence the recurrence of intrastate conflict she finds that the
current living conditions in a country is highly associated with the probability of civil war
recurrence. Using infant mortality, life expectancy, and adult literacy individually in addition to
a composite index of all three factors, Walter (2004) argues that poor living conditions
influence the risk of conflict because of the effect living conditions have on an individual’s
propensity to enlist, or re-enlist, with rebel organizations. Although male secondary education
enrollment, life expectancy, infant mortality, and adult literacy do serve as acceptable proxies
for socioeconomic development, they are less appropriate for measuring socioeconomic capital
with respect to state power.5 Pivotal to successful peacebuilding is monopolizing the legitimate
use of force – without basic physical security, sustainable peace is highly improbable. This
analysis chooses electricity consumption per capita as the most appropriate proxy for
socioeconomic capital and physical infrastructure; GDP per capita will be used to check model
robustness.

5

Sambanis and Doyle (2006) argue that life expectancy, infant mortality, and adult literacy are less theoretically
tied to incentives for waging war.
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In sum, two critical factors encompass the socioeconomic local capacities dimension for
building peace, or for state reconstruction: broadcast of state power and socioeconomic
capital. Theoretically, internal domestic threats are less likely to succeed in waging war when a
state is able to broadcast power to its borders, just as people are less likely to wage war when
their basic needs are met. The modern state system favors external sovereignty, as opposed to
internal sovereignty, with control of the capital city corresponding to internationally recognized
leadership of a country. Consequently, the system encourages state echelons to focus on
controlling the capital city and its immediate surrounding areas, instead of controlling the rural
terrain. State power will be operationalized as rural population density and as the percentage
of the total population that is urban.6 The direction of the relationship between rural
population density or percent urban population and peacebuilding success is ambiguous. On
one hand, greater rural population density could mean a larger population residing outside
state power because the rural periphery is further away from the urban capital. On the other
hand, greater rural population density could mean that the rural population is less scattered
thereby making the rural terrain more conducive to consolidating state power. Any large
country with non-contiguous areas of high population density is likely to have low levels of
state power.7 For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a prime example of a “rimland” country, or a country where the high population concentrations are located in border
regions while the interior is relatively empty (Herbst 2000). State power as percent urban
6

In most cases of intrastate conflict the state itself is part of the problem. For the purposes of this analysis,
greater state power is expected to have a positive relationship with building peace because it corresponds to a
greater degree of extant physical infrastructure. More physical infrastructure coincides with less of a need for
infrastructure building, which corresponds with a greater chance for successfully building peace.
7
Benin is an example of a country with favorable population dispersion: a small country with the highest
concentration of power found in one area, located around the capital city, with population densities diminishing as
the distance from the capital increases (Herbst 2000).
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population could also be argued both ways. Greater percent urban population could mean that
a larger percentage of the population is within the boundaries of state power because more
people are residing in the urban capital. Alternatively, greater percent urban population could
mean that the rural domain is unsafe or unable to sustain populations. If people reside in
urban conglomerates because they are unable to receive their basic needs in the rural domain,
then greater percent urban population would mean less state power. Socioeconomic capital
refers to whether or not the state is able to provide its population with basic needs – e.g.
water, food, shelter, and basic physical security – which largely depends on physical
infrastructure. Electricity consumption per capita will serve as the proxy for socioeconomic
capital.8

Probability of Intrastate Conflict
Many scholars have emphasized the impact natural resources have on the probability of
intrastate war onset (Collier 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 2007). Theoretically, factors that
influence the risk of intrastate conflict should also influence the probability of post-conflict
peacebuilding success. Specifically, two central arguments have been made. First, Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) attest that natural resources influence conflict risk because they provide rebel
groups with the financial opportunities which make rebellion feasible, if not desirable. In the
absence of natural resources, spoilers generally procure funding via Diaspora donations or aid
from other governments (Bigombe et al 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). For instance, the
Renamo rebellion in Mozambique was primarily funded by the government of Southern
8

Electricity consumption per capita is highly correlated with income in addition to presupposing sufficient physical
infrastructure (Sambanis and Doyle 2006).
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Rhodesia, or present day Zimbabwe (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Countries with substantial
American Diaspora have a 36% risk of conflict, in comparison to countries with small Diaspora
populations having a 6% chance of conflict (Collier 2000). The involvement of the Tamil
diaspora in the Sri Lankan insurgency highlights the immense impact Diaspora can have on
intrastate conflict. The Tamil diaspora played a pivotal role in encouraging the LTTE to enter a
ceasefire with Colombo (Fair 2005). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that the peak risk of
conflict is associated with countries that have 33% primary commodity exports (as percent of
GDP); the significance of primary commodity exports holds even when categorized according to
which type of product was dominant. Moreover, Collier (2007) finds that the most precarious
level of primary commodity dependence is 26%, which is associated with a 23% greater risk of
conflict. Opposing Collier (2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005) argues that the
influence of primary commodity dependence on civil war risk is attributed to oil: oil is a major
source of primary commodity dependence and significant oil production increases conflict risk.
For example, the internal conflicts in Angola, the second largest sub-Saharan oil producer and
the fourth largest world diamond producer by value, were funded via both diamonds and oil,
with the MPLA controlling oil and UNITA controlling diamonds (Le Billon 2001). Second,
scholars argue that natural resources weaken state institutions (e.g. less need for taxation,
therefore less political accountability) which increases the risk of conflict (Fearon and Laitin
2003; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Fearon and Laitin (2004) find that greater oil exports do
increase conflict risk. This analysis will test all of these proxies for insurgent funding sources:
natural resource dependency, Diaspora size, and oil dependency.
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There are a broad array of existing theories pertaining to ethnic, religious, and linguistic
fragmentation and domestic internecine. According to Collier (2000), ethnic dominance – when
one ethnic group comprises between 45% and 90% of the total population – doubles the risk of
domestic conflict. An ethnic group constituting 45% of a total state population is likely to have
a stable winning coalition even in a democracy (Bigombe et al 2000). Other than ethnic
dominance, more ethnically and religiously heterogeneous societies are significantly less likely
to exhibit intrastate war; ethnically and religiously homogenous societies have a conflict risk of
23% in comparison to the 3% for highly diverse societies (Collier 2000). Fearon and Laitin
(2003) explore the hypothesis that ethnic fractionalization should be especially influential in
determining the probability of conflict in the presence of higher per capita income. This
hypothesis stems from modernist theories: new economic opportunity structures spawned
from economic growth can be problematic in ethnically or religiously fragmented societies
because access to these new economic opportunities will likely follow existing ethnic or
religious cleavages. For example, the Rwandan civil war was fought between the Hutu majority
and the Tutsi minority, which resulted in genocide.9 Reynal-Querol (2002) argues that religious
fractionalization is more problematic than ethnic or linguistic fragmentation because religious
identities are especially fixed and nonnegotiable. Furthermore, the type of political system (e.g.
consociational democracy) and level of democracy affect the probability of ethnic civil war
(Reynal-Querol 2002). Ross (2003) suspects a relationship between separatist conflicts and
unlootable resources as well as nonseparatist conflicts and lootable resources – lootable

9

It is important to note how emigration sometimes changes ethnic dominance, as was the case in the former
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia gradually transformed from having no one group constituting as much as 45% of the total
population into a series of independent countries, each exhibiting ethnic dominance (Bigombe et al 2000).
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resources are more likely to benefit a rebel group and unlootable resources are more likely to
benefit the government.10 This analysis will proxy ethnoreligious topography with following
variables: an ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, a religious fractionalization index, a binary
measure of ethnic dominance, and a binary measure of religious dominance.

In sum, the second local capacities dimension, probability of civil war, encompasses two central
facets: conflict means and ethnoreligious topography. Insurgents first require the cost of using
violence to be low in comparison to the anticipated gains in order to bolster enlistment, and
second, insurgents require the financial vitality to wage war. There are three main categories
of insurgent funding sources: natural resource extortion, assistance from Diasporas, or
subventions from hostile governments (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Natural resource extortion
will be proxied by primary commodity exports as a percent of GDP (e.g. natural resource
dependency) and by a binary measure of oil dependency (e.g. one-third or more of total
exports derived from oil). Diaspora assistance will be proxied by the number of emigrants living
in the US as a proportion of the total population in the country of origin.11 Greater natural
resource dependency, oil dependency, and Diaspora size should correspond with a greater risk
of conflict. Also relevant are the presence of lootable resources,12 defined as natural resources
easily attainable by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers, especially when rural
population density is high; larger populations existing outside state power with access to
lucrative resources coincides with a greater probability of civil war outbreak. For example, the
10

This could be measured by the interaction of the war type variable and the lootable resources variable.
A Cold War dummy variable is already included in Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) analysis as a control variable.
12
e.g. gems, opium, diamonds, timber, cocoa, iron, palm oil, coffee, marijuana, rubber (as opposed to unlootable
resources, e.g. oil, natural gas, copper, gold)
11
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heavy diamond endowment of the Kono District in Sierra Leone funded the insurgencies during
both civil wars (Zach-Williams 1999). Lootable resources will be proxied by a dichotomous
variable measuring whether or not a country is endowed with diamonds and will also be
interacted with a measure of rural population density.13 The purpose of the interaction variable
is to intensify the importance of rural population density when coinciding with lootable
resources. Ethnic, linguistic, or religious fragmentation should only be problematic when ethnic
dominance is present; otherwise, ethnic or religious heterogeneity should correspond with
societies less susceptible to civil strife. Ethnoreligious fragmentation will be proxied by an
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index and a religious fractionalization index; higher
ethnoreligious fragmentation should coincide with a lower risk of conflict. Furthermore,
ethnoreligious dominance will be proxied by two binary variables, with one corresponding to
countries with one ethnic group, or one religious group, constituting between 45% and 90% of
the total population. Ethnic and religious dominance should coincide with an increase in
conflict risk.

Propensity for Democratization
Post-conflict environments favorable to democratization should correlate with a greater
probability of peacebuilding success because democratization is an inherent element of
peacebuilding. In an influential analysis exploring the relationship between democracy and
development, Przeworski et al (2000) show how democratic regimes are unstable in countries
with a low level of economic development and stable in affluent environments. Moreover, the

13

Diamond endowment refers to primary and secondary diamond production.
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democratic peace thesis argues that democratic states are unlikely to go to war with each
other, yet transitioning democracies are more likely to go to war than non-democratic states
(Doyle 1997). There is strong consensus in the contemporary international community that
post-conflict peacebuilding operations must favor political openness or democratic principles.
Accepting this norm, scholars argue that a country that has had some previous experience with
democracy is more conducive to democratization (Carothers 2007; Sambanis and Doyle 2006;
Paris 2004; Serwer and Thomson 2007). Post-conflict Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Israel all
exhibited considerable previous experience with political pluralism, and all established either a
post-war republic or a parliamentary democracy. Walter’s (2004) analysis concerning the
determinants of renewed intrastate war includes three proxies for political openness including
an overall democracy/autocracy scale, a measure of executive constraints on the executive
branch, and a measure of political openness. Alternatively, in Hartzell’s et al (2001) study of
civil war settlement stability, a dichotomous measure of previous regime type was used to
proxy democratic experience. Although executive constraints and political openness are
important measures of democratic quality, they are less related to the exposure of the citizenry
to political participation and democratic ideals. This analysis conceptualizes domestic capacity
for democratization – the third and final local capacities dimension – in terms of basic
democratic exposure, which will be proxied by the following: a pre-war five year average
democracy score (e.g. Vanhanen democracy index) and a political participation score (e.g.
Vanhanen).14 This analysis chose the Vanhanen Democracy Index over a Polity score (e.g.
democracy/autocracy scale) or a dichotomous measure of previous regime type because
14

A measure of political participation is one of the elements of the Vanhanen Democracy Index; the other factor is
a measure of political competition.
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propensity for democratization is conceptualized as previous experience with democracy,
which has less to do with measuring how autocratic a regime is. Furthermore, including a
measure of political participation is beneficial because it focuses on mass-level political
exposure. A higher democracy or political participation score should correspond with a greater
probability of peacebuilding success.15

Social Capital
Many scholars have theorized an additional local capacities dimension, social capital.
Fukuyama (2002) points out that social capital is essential to economic development and
democratic consolidation, both of which are factors that influence the likelihood of postconflict peacebuilding success. As a concept, social capital generally refers to densely
embedded networks of relationships between individuals and groups (Onyx and Bullen 2000;
Portes 1998; Putnam 1993; Woolcock 1998). Putnam’s (1993) study exploring the relationship
between social capital and government performance highlights the distinction between
horizontal relationships and vertical relationships. Paxton (2002) emphasizes the importance of
distinguishing between different forms of social capital (e.g. bridging and bonding), both
negative and positive, and the effects they have on transitioning democracies and consolidated
democracies. The first measure of social capital Paxton (2002) employed was an index of two
variables – the density of associations in each county and the level of generalized trust present
– both of which were determined using survey data. Association density was operationalized as
the average number of voluntary association memberships and the average number of
15

A pre-war five year Polity score average and a dichotomous variable of previous regime type (with one equating
a Polity score of greater than five) will also be tested to check model robustness.
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voluntary association memberships for which the member did unpaid voluntary work during
the past year (Paxton 2002). Paxton’s (2002) second measure of social capital was the number
of international nongovernmental organizations present in each country. Alternatively,
scholars have measured social capital as the heterogeneity of memberships in associations
(Coffe and Geys 2007; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). In addition to treating social capital as an
independent variable, scholars have conceptualized social capital as a product of its
institutional environment (Collier and Gunning 1999; Knack and Keefer 1997; North 1990).
Knack and Keefer (1997) measure social capital as a combination of the level of trust in a
society and the strength of norms of civic cooperation, both of which were obtained via
individual survey data.

Although scholars have increasingly taken an interest in conceptualizing social capital with
respect to peacebuilding, the existing literature still lacks any sufficient operationalization of
social capital. The aforementioned social capital proxies – association density and
heterogeneity of association membership – have been generated via individual level survey
data; the kind of survey data required for this analysis is not currently available. Furthermore,
measuring social capital as the number of INGOs present in each country also requires data that
does not currently exist. Consequently, social capital will not be explored as a local capacities
dimension in this analysis. If future studies could generate a consistent and reliable countrylevel measure of association membership heterogeneity throughout the post-war era, this
dimension could plausibly be included in the local capacity index.

20
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

Sambanis and Doyle (2001; 2006) were predominantly concerned with exploring the
contribution of UN peace operations to post-war peacebuilding success. Alternatively, this
analysis is focused on the relationship between a country’s local capacities level and the
probability of post-conflict peacebuilding success. The aim of this analysis is to show how
adding depth to post-conflict local capacity can offer important insight into the likelihood of
peacebuilding success in addition to the broader relationship between domestic politics and
peace.

Using the same international capacities index and hostility index as Sambanis and Doyle (2006),
several new local capacities indexes will be constructed and evaluated within the peacebuilding
triangle model. The new indexes will be weighted so that each country is measured in relation
to all of the other countries included in the analysis, which parallels Sambanis and Doyle’s
(2006) model. First, multiple logistic regression models with robust standard errors and
clustered same-country observations will be tested using the new local capacity variables.16
Furthermore, models will also be tested excluding each individual local capacities dimension,
one at a time, in order to offer insight into the contribution of each specific dimension.

The best models will be transformed into local capacities indexes, each ranging from zero to
one. Next, logistic regression models, with robust standard errors and clustered by country, of
16

This analysis tests a dichotomous dependent variable – peacebuilding success – using balanced data; therefore a
logistic regression model is most appropriate.
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the new local capacities indexes, and Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) international capacities
index and hostility index, will be tested to determine if the new local capacities indexes improve
the efficacy of the peacebuilding triangle model.

Finally, several specific peacebuilding triangles will be measured and compared to Sambanis
and Doyle’s (2006) model as an additional check for model robustness.

The Data
This analysis utilizes a cross-sectional dataset comprised of 119 intrastate conflicts, spanning
the time period between 1945 and 1999, including 66 countries.17 Of the 66 countries, 6 are in
Europe,18 11 are in Latin America,19 16 are in the Middle Eastern and North African region,20 13
are in Asia,21 and 20 are in sub-Saharan Africa.22 Following Sambanis and Doyle (2000; 2006),

17

Following Sambanis and Doyle (2006), a total of 151 conflicts are included in the dataset, however, only 119
conflicts are measured for peacebuilding success. All wars that were ongoing at the cutoff date (e.g. December 31,
1999) or wars that showed no significant peace process prior to the cutoff date were excluded from the analysis
(Sambanis and Doyle 2006).
18
Most of the European countries – including Moldova, Croatia, Russia, the former Yugoslavia, and Greece –
exhibit one domestic conflict; however, Cyprus has two conflicts included in the dataset.
19
Of the Latin American countries, 7 (i.e. Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru, Cuba, Bolivia, and
Paraguay) countries had one intrastate conflict and 4 countries (i.e. Argentina, Guatemala, Colombia, and
Nicaragua) exhibited two civil wars.
20
Morocoo/Western Sahara, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Azerbaijan, Yemen PR, Oman, Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen all had
one intrastate conflict included in the dataset. Additionally, Georgia, Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Yemen AR
each had two wars; lastly, Iraq exhibited 5 civil wars.
21
Of the 13 countries in Asia, 5 (i.e. Vietnam, Bangladesh, Laos, Thailand, and Korea) countries displayed one
conflict, 2 countries (i.e. Cambodia and Pakistan) had two wars, 4 countries (i.e. Sri Lanka, Myanmar/Burma, India,
and the Philippines) exhibited three conflicts each, and 2 countries (i.e. Indonesia and China) each displayed five
civil wars.
22
Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the most post-war civil conflicts, with Congo-Brazzaville, South Africa,
Djibouti, Namibia, Mozambique, and Mali all having one civil war; Somalia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Sudan, and Liberia exhibiting two conflicts each; Rwanda, Angola, Chad, Burundi, and Ethiopia displaying
three intrastate wars; and Uganda and Congo-Zaire exhibiting four civil conflicts each.
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an armed conflict is classified as a civil war if: the conflict takes place within the territorial
bounds of an internationally recognized state consisting of a population of at least 500,000, the
warring parties have publicly stated political objectives and are both politically and militarily
organized, the internationally recognized government is one of the warring parties via the use
of its military or militias, the insurgencies have a local base (e.g. they must recruit from the local
population), the war accumulates more than 1,000 deaths in a least a single year, the
insurgencies are able to mount effective resistance against the government (i.e. the weaker
party has to inflict a minimum of 100 deaths on the stronger party), and the war duration
exhibits sustained violence.23

The Dependent Variable
Sambanis and Doyle (2000; 2006) use two measures of peacebuilding success in their analysis: a
measure of “negative” peace and a measure of “positive” peace. “Negative,” otherwise termed
“sovereign” peace, is primarily concerned with the absence of large-scale violence, and requires
the war to have ended, the existence of undivided sovereignty, the absence of substantial
residual violence, as well as the absence of state-committed mass-level human rights abuses.24
The second operationalization of peacebuilding success is “positive” or “participatory” peace.
“Participatory” peace is defined as “sovereign” peace with the additional requirement of a
minimal level of political openness.25 Both dependent variables are measured two years after

23

Sustained violence means that for any given three year period, a minimum of 500 battle-related deaths must
have occurred (Sambanis and Doyle 2006).
24
The dataset includes 68 “sovereign” peace failures and 53 successes. Residual violence corresponds to
approximately 200 annual deaths (Sambanis and Doyle 2006).
25
A total of 37 cases were classified as having attained “participatory” peace; the remaining 84 cases were coded
“participatory” failures. Sambanis and Doyle (2006) employ a polity threshold of 3 or below for coding a minimal
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the cessation of war.26 Although two years is an arbitrary cutoff, employing a two year
threshold allows this analysis to compare its results to that of Sambanis and Doyle (2006).
Moreover, this analysis defines peacebuilding success in terms of the absence of large-scale
violence and a minimal level of political openness thereby focusing on physical security.
Establishing basic physical security is of the utmost importance at the onset of peacebuilding;
without physical security, long-term peacebuilding efforts will likely fail. This analysis will focus
on “participatory” peace.

The Explanatory Variables
This analysis replicates Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) chosen hostility and international
capacities indexes (see Appendix A). All of the indexes utilized in this analysis will be
constructed vis-à-vis all of the countries included in the dataset. The hostility index includes a
measure of war type, which is a binary variable distinguishing between ethnoreligious wars and
non-ethnoreligious wars (H1),27 a measure of the human cost of war, or the natural log of the
total number of deaths and displacements accumulated by the conflict (H2), and a measure of
war duration (H3). In sum, ethnoreligious wars, conflicts generating greater human cost, and
wars that span shorter periods of time, should correspond with high levels of post-conflict
hostility. Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) chosen international capacity index includes an
interaction variable: the type of UN mission (I1) multiplied by whether or not a peace treaty was

level of political openness; the polity score ranges from 0 to 20, with maximum democracy corresponding to 20
and extreme autocracy coinciding with 0.
26
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) also measure “sovereign” and “participatory” peace with a 5-year threshold. For
more extensive coding and classification details, see Sambanis and Doyle (2006).
27
A total of 97 conflicts were classified as an ethnoreligious war.
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signed (I2).28 UN mandates were coded 0 through 5 according to mission intensity: no UN
mandate corresponds with 0, mediation mandates equate 1, observer missions are denoted by
2, 3 represents tradition peace keeping operations, 4 signifies multidimensional peace keeping
operations, and enforcement missions equate 5.29 Peace treaty is measured as a dichotomous
variable with 1 signifying the presence of a signed peace treaty.30

All of the new local capacities indexes will include the following variables (see Appendix B):
electricity consumption per capita (L1),31 Diaspora size as percent US (L2),32 ethnic dominance
(L3), and religious dominance (L4) (e.g. one group equating between 45% and 90% of the total
state population).33 The two state power proxies - rural population density (L5a) and percent
urban population (L5b) – will be tested in alternate models. The following pairs of variables will
also be alternated between models: primary commodity exports as percent GDP (L6a) and oil
dependency (L6b); Vanhanen democracy score (L7a) and political participation score (L7b). Ethnic
fractionalization (L8) and religious fractionalization (L9) will be tested individually in addition to
each being interacted with per capita electricity consumption. Moreover, lootable resource
endowment (L10) will be tested independently and interacted with rural population density.
Ethnic and religious dominance will also both be interacted with Diaspora size. The models
28

It may also be useful to construct alternative international capacities indexes that include a measure of non-UN
peace missions and a measure of UN troop intensity – Sambanis and Doyle (2006) already have these variables in
their dataset. A new variable measuring all peace missions could be constructed; non-UN peace missions could be
classified as having the same level of intensity as a UN mediation mission (intensity=1).
29
The breakdown of UN mandates measured in the dataset is as follows: 107 conflicts without UN mandates, 10
mediation missions (4 with signed peace treaties), 13 observer missions (8 with signed peace treaties), 8 traditional
peace keeping operations (5 with signed peace treaties), 7 multidimensional peace keeping operations (7 with
signed peace treaties), and 6 enforcement missions (3 with signed peace treaties).
30
The dataset includes 102 conflicts without signed peace treaties and 45 conflicts with signed peace treaties.
31
The measure of electricity consumption per capita is rescaled, or divided by 100.
32
Diaspora size is rescaled, or divided by 1,000.
33
GDP per capita will be tested in place of electricity consumption per capita to check model robustness.
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with rural population density will also test an interaction between rural population density and
electricity consumption per capita and the urban population models will include an interaction
between percent urban population and electricity consumption per capita. Additionally, local
capacities indexes will be constructed excluding each of the individual local capacities
dimensions, one at a time. Models will be tested with these local capacities indexes in order to
shed light on the importance of each specific local capacities dimension.

The following control variables will be included in this analysis: a binary variable measuring
whether or not the war is classified as a Cold War conflict controlling for systemic constraints
(C1) , a dummy measure controlling for sub-Saharan Africa (C2), and a variable measuring the
per capita size of the country’s military at the end of the war (C3). Conventional wisdom holds
that securing basic physical security is of the utmost importance during the initial peacebuilding
phases. Adequate DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of ex-combatants) is
essential to providing basic physical security; the measure of military personnel (in thousands)
is a proxy for the difficulty associated with establishing basic physical security. Furthermore,
the greater the number of military personnel present, the greater the government’s capacity to
deter any third party intervention.
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5. HYPOTHESES

HYPOTHESIS 1. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should be greater in
post-conflict environments displaying more physical infrastructure, or a greater degree
of state power.
HYPOTHESIS 2. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase in
contexts exhibiting greater levels of socioeconomic development.

On a basic level, if a state is unable to project power to its periphery and is unable to provide
basic physical needs to its people, then the state is at high risk of intrastate conflict (Ball 2001;
Herbst 2000; Rotberg 2007). Populations that live outside the realm of state power are unlikely
to receive state resources and are not subjected to the laws of the state. The larger these
populations are, the more equipped they are to wage war against the state. Take, for instance,
the Ethiopian civil war that led to the independence of Eritrea in 1993. One reason why Addis
Ababa was unable to control the civil war was the country’s scattered population dispersion
(Herbst 2000). Furthermore, scholars show how economic grievance – a common characteristic
of impoverished states – can easily erupt into civil war. Countries with more developed
economies are therefore less susceptible to civil war in addition to being better equipped to
rebuild after war. The higher the level of economic development, the more prepared a country
is to rebuild after civil conflict, and the less susceptible the country is to wars developing from
economic grievance.

HYPOTHESIS 3. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a
country is more dependent on natural resource rents.
HYPOTHESIS 4. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a
country has significant Diaspora populations.
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HYPOTHESIS 5. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a
country is endowed with lootable resources.
HYPOTHESIS 6. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a
country has a higher rural population density while simultaneously being endowed
with lootable resources.

Civil wars cannot be waged without revenue sources. Insurgents generally secure their
financial vitality via natural resource extortion, donations from Diasporas, or subventions from
other governments. The Sikh diaspora enabled the Khalistan insurgency, the Kono District
fueled the rebels in Sierra Leone, and Renamo was primed by the government of Southern
Rhodesia. Lootable resources are particularly easy to extort, which is why having larger
populations able to access lootable resources is especially daunting. Additionally, natural
resource dependence tends to coincide with undiversified economies, and undiversified
economies are particularly sensitive to commodity price shocks and tend to lack substantial
manufacturing and service sectors that cultivate human capital and stimulate economic growth
(Sambanis and Doyle 2006).

HYPOTHESIS 7. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase with
greater ethnic or religious fractionalization.
HYPOTHESIS 8. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a
country exhibits ethnic or religious fractionalization and increasing socioeconomic
capital.
HYPOTHESIS 9. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease with
ethnic or religious dominance.
HYPOTHESIS 10. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease with
ethnic or religious dominance and greater Diaspora populations.
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From a conflict resolution perspective, more groups make determining settlement terms a
more arduous task, assuming that ethnic groups generally have a set of shared preferences.
Ethnic and religious heterogeneity should be even more influential with respect to the
probability of conflict in environments with higher levels of socioeconomic development.
Additionally, ethnic or religious dominance should increase the likelihood of conflict, thereby
decreasing the probability of peacebuilding success. Larger Diaspora populations are especially
problematic in the presence of ethnic or religious dominance, as the Sri Lankan civil war
emphasizes.

HYPOTHESIS 11. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should be greater when
a country has had some previous experience with political pluralism.

The existing literature on democratization emphasizes previous experience with political
pluralism as favoring democratization. Societies previously exposed to democratic institutions
and ideals are likely to require less democratic education and should therefore be more
conducive to democratization.

HYPOTHESIS 12. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a
conflict has accumulated greater war-related deaths and displacements.
HYPOTHESIS 13. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase when a
conflict has greater war duration.
HYPOTHESIS 14. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease with
ethnic or religious based wars.

The greater the human costs of war, the less social and human capital available, thereby
creating a society ill-equipped to rebound after civil conflict. Additionally, the greater the
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human costs of war, the greater the social-psychological damage is which is an impediment
to successful peacebuilding. Scholars have argued both directions for war duration.
Theoretically, longer wars generally accumulate more deaths and displacements thereby
increasing the level of hostility. However, warring factions also grow tired of fighting as war
duration increases thereby making peace more likely. In concordance with Doyle and
Sambanis (2001), this analysis hypothesizes that war duration will have a positive
relationship with peacebuilding success. Ethnic and religious cleavages can easily be used
as mediums for channeling hostility, which in turn, can mobilize support for identity-based
wars. Additionally, ethnic or religious wars generally make reconciliation more difficult.

HYPOTHESIS 15. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase when a
war ends with a signed peace treaty.
HYPOTHESIS 16. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase with
greater UN involvement in the form of UN peace operations.

Peace treaties represent the willingness of warring factions to agree to end the use of violence
and begin to pursue non-violent mechanisms to achieve their desires. Therefore, a signed
peace treaty also indicates that the post-conflict level of hostility will be relatively low.
Moreover, peace treaties enable international involvement in the peace process. The presence
of a UN mandate represents international interest in ending the conflict, in addition to
substantial access to third party assistance and technical expertise. The type of UN peace
operation corresponds with an ordinal scale measuring the intensity of third party aid and
assistance.
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6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A total of 8 logistic models were tested, including 4 rural population density models and 4
percent urban population models (see Appendix C). All of the models correctly classify
between approximately 85% and 90% of the cases. Model 1 correctly predicts 89.66% of the
peacebuilding successes, which is slightly higher than the other 7 models. Additionally, Model 1
reduces the error in predictions by between 4.46% and 21.16% in comparison to the other
models. Therefore, Model 1 will be used for post-estimation analysis. The Wald test for each
of the models confirms that all of the independent variables combined have a significant effect
on the probability of peacebuilding success.

When the socioeconomic endowment proxies are excluded from the model, the model
correctly classifies 86.21% of the cases, with a reduction in error of 50.01% (see Model 3 in
Appendix D). Therefore, the socioeconomic endowment dimension improves the percent
correctly classified by 3.45% and the percent reduction in error by 12.51%. Excluding the
probability of civil war proxies, the model correctly classifies 84.62% of the cases, with a
reduction in error of 28.02%; the probability of civil war dimension improves the percent
correctly classified by 5.04% and the percent reduction in error by 34.50% (see Model 1 in
Appendix D). Moreover, when the propensity for democratization proxy is excluded, the model
correctly classifies 88.79% of the cases, with a reduction in error of 58.06% (see Model 2 in
Appendix D). Therefore, the propensity for democratization dimension improves the percent
correctly classified by 0.87% and the percent reduction in error by 4.46%.
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HYPOTHESIS 1. State Power
The first state power proxy, rural population density, is positive and significant in 3 out of 4
models. This suggests that greater rural population density corresponds with a greater degree
of state power and therefore a greater probability of peacebuilding success. Holding all other
variable at central values, and with lootable resource endowment set at 1, simultaneously
increasing rural population density from 2.623 (50th percentile) to 22.100 (99th percentile),
decreasing its interaction with electricity consumption per capita from 0.510 (50th percentile) to
0.025 (1st percentile), and increasing its interaction with lootable resource endowment from 0
(50th percentile) to 6.271 (99th percentile) results in a 28.2% decrease in the probability of
peacebuilding success. Therefore, high rural population density in the presence of lootable
resources is highly problematic.

When lootable resource endowment and its interaction are set at 0, and all other variables are
set at central values, simultaneously increasing rural population density from 2.623 (50th
percentile) to 22.100 (99th percentile) and decreasing its interaction with electricity
consumption per capita from 0.510 (50th percentile) to 0.025 (1st percentile), the probability of
peacebuilding success increases by 33.6%. These results indicate that in the absence of
lootable resources, high rural population density corresponds with a 33.6% increase in the
likelihood of peacebuilding success.

Furthermore, holding all other variables at central values, simultaneously increasing rural
population density from 0.940 (10th percentile) to 6.218 (90th percentile), decreasing electricity
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consumption per capita from 14.943 (90th percentile) to 0.308 (10th percentile), and decreasing
its interaction with rural population density from 12.348 (90th percentile) to 0.070 (10th
percentile) results in a 7% decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success. According to
these results, high rural population density combined with low electricity consumption per
capita corresponds with a 7% decrease in the likelihood of peacebuilding success.

The second state power proxy, percent urban population, is negative and significant in all 4
models, suggesting that larger urban populations correspond with a lower degree of state
power. Therefore, larger urban populations have a negative relationship with peacebuilding
success.

HYPOTHESIS 2. Socioeconomic Capital
Electricity consumption per capita, the proxy for socioeconomic development, is positive and
significant in all of the rural population density models. With all other variables held at central
values, simultaneously increasing electricity consumption per capita, its interaction with rural
population density, ethnic fractionalization, and its interaction with electricity consumption per
capita from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile results in a 17.4% increase in the
probability of peacebuilding success.34 Furthermore, simultaneously increasing electricity
consumption per capita, its interaction with rural population density, ethnic fractionalization,
its interaction with electricity consumption per capita, religious fractionalization, and its

34

Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 14.943, its interaction with rural population density
increased from 0.070 to 12.348, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.877, and its interaction with
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 4.969.
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interaction with electricity consumption per capita from the 10th percentile to the 90th
percentile, while holding all other variables at central values, results in a 0.5% increase in the
likelihood of peacebuilding success.35 These results indicate that electricity consumption per
capita generally has a strong positive relationship with peacebuilding success unless religious
fractionalization is high. High religious fractionalization decreases the impact of high electricity
consumption per capita by 16.9%.

With all other variables held at central values, simultaneously increasing electricity
consumption per capita, its interaction with rural population density, ethnic fractionalization,
and its interaction with electricity consumption per capita from the 10th percentile to the 90th
percentile, in addition to increasing religious fractionalization and its interaction with electricity
consumption per capita from the 10th percentile to the 50th percentile (e.g. a moderate level of
religious fractionalization), results in a 34.4% increase in the probability of peacebuilding
success.36 Moreover, when electricity consumption per capita, its interaction with rural
population density, ethnic fractionalization, its interaction with electricity consumption per
capita, religious fractionalization, and its interaction with electricity consumption per capita are
simultaneously increased from the 10th percentile to the 95th percentile, while all other
variables are held at central values, the chances of peacebuilding success increases by a mere
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Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 14.943, its interaction with rural population density
increased from 0.070 to 12.348, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.877, its interaction with
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 4.969, religious fractionalization increased from 0.112
to 0.680, and its interaction increased from 0.087 to 6.408.
36
Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 14.943, its interaction with rural population density
increased from 0.070 to 12.348, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.877, its interaction with
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 4.969, religious fractionalization increased from 0.112
to 0.445, and its interaction increased from 0.087 to 0.646.
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2.5%.37 Again, these results support the previous conclusion that electricity consumption per
capita tends to have a strong positive relationship with peacebuilding success so long as
religious fractionalization is not high.

For the percent urban population models, electricity consumption per capita and its interaction
with percent urban population are both never significant; however, electricity consumption per
capita proves to be positive while electricity consumption per capita interacted with percent
urban population proves to be negative.

HYPOTHESIS 3. Natural Resource Dependency
Dependency on natural resource rents is negative and significant in all of the models, as is oil
dependency. When natural resource dependency increases from 0.023 (10th percentile) to
0.347 (90th percentile), with all other variables held at central values, the probability of
peacebuilding success decreases by 5.6%. Furthermore, holding all other variables at central
values, increasing natural resource dependency from 0.023 (10th percentile) to 0.260 (e.g. the
level of dependency that Collier (2007) determined to be the most precarious) results in a 6.9%
decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success. However, when natural resource
dependency is increased from 0.260 to 0.505 (95th percentile), with all other variables held at
central values, the chances of peacebuilding success decreases by a mere 0.2%. These results
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Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 24.400, its interaction with rural population density
increased from 0.070 to 18.463, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.899, its interaction with
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 7.394, religious fractionalization increased from 0.112
to 0.724, and its interaction increased from 0.087 to 8.861.
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suggest that natural resource dependency is particularly problematic up to the 0.260 threshold,
after which, its impact becomes significantly less substantial.

HYPOTHESIS 4. Diaspora Size
Diaspora size is negative and significant in all of the models. Holding all other variables at
central values, and with religious dominance and its interaction both set at 0, simultaneously
increasing Diaspora size from 0.002 (10th percentile) to 2.844 (90th percentile), increasing ethnic
dominance from 0 to 1, and its interaction with Diaspora size from 0 to 2.844 (90th percentile)
results in a 7.4% decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success. Therefore, ethnic
dominance, in the absence of religious dominance and combined with a larger Diaspora size,
lowers the chances of peacebuilding success by 7.4%.

Holding all other variables at central values, and with ethnic dominance and its interaction set
at 0, simultaneously increasing Diaspora size from 0.002 (10th percentile) to 2.844 (90th
percentile), increasing religious dominance from 0 to 1, and its interaction with Diaspora size
from 0 to 2.844 (90th percentile) results in a 6% decrease in the likelihood of peacebuilding
success. These results suggest that religious dominance, in the absence of ethnic dominance
and combined with a larger Diaspora size, correspond with a 6% decrease in the chances of
peacebuilding success.

When Diaspora size is increased from 0.002 (10th percentile) to 2.844 (90th percentile), with
ethnic dominance, religious dominance, and their interactions all set at 0, and holding all other
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variables at central values, the probability of peacebuilding success decreases by 9%.
Therefore, larger Diaspora populations moderately decrease the probability of peacebuilding
success.

HYPOTHESIS 5. Lootable Resource Endowment
In contrast to the predicted direction, lootable resource endowment positively correlates with
peacebuilding success and is significant in all of the rural population density models. With
lootable resource endowment interacted with rural population density set at 2.557 (85th
percentile), and with all other variables held at central values, increasing lootable resource
endowment from 0 to 1 results in a 3.7% increase in the probability of peacebuilding success.38
One explanation for the positive effect of lootable resource endowment could be that lootable
resources provide substantial revenue for states so long as the state has enough power to
protect these resources from insurgents. Furthermore, lootable resources require little
expertise and infrastructure, thereby making them especially useful for countries lacking in
these capacities.

HYPOTHESIS 6. Lootable Resource Endowment & Rural Population Density
Lootable resource endowment interacted with rural population density is negative and
significant in all 8 models. As previously stated, high rural population density combined with
lootable resource endowment corresponds with a 28.8% decrease in the probability of

38

Approximately 30% of the cases are endowed with lootable resources. Setting lootable resource endowment
th
interacted with rural population density at the 85 percentile corresponds to the mid-range for cases endowed
with lootable resources.

37
peacebuilding success (refer to Hypothesis 1. State Power). This suggests that larger rural
populations with access to lootable resources create an environment less favorable to
peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 7. Ethnic & Religious Fractionalization
Both ethnic fractionalization and religious fractionalization have mixed results. Ethnic
fractionalization negatively correlates with peacebuilding success, but is not significant in any of
the models. Similarly, religious fractionalization is also never significant, however, the direction
of its relationship with peacebuilding success is inconsistent (e.g. negative in 3 of the 4 percent
urban populations and positive for the other 5 models). These results suggest that ethnic and
religious fractionalization independently do not have a relationship with peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 8. Ethnic & Religious Fractionalization & Electricity Consumption Per Capita
Ethnic fractionalization interacted with electricity consumption per capita is not significant in
any of the models. Religious fractionalization interacted with electricity consumption per
capita is negative and significant in all of the rural population density models. Although ethnic
fractionalization interacted with electricity consumption per capita does not show a
relationship with peacebuilding success, religious fractionalization does prove to be
problematic in environments with socioeconomic growth thereby decreasing the probability of
peacebuilding success. As previously states, the strong positive effect of high electricity
consumption per capita on peacebuilding success can be drastically offset by high religious
fractionalization (refer to Hypothesis 2. Socioeconomic Capital).
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HYPOTHESIS 9. Ethnic & Religious Dominance
Although religious dominance is never significant and does not follow the predicted direction,
ethnic dominance is negative and significant in all of the models. Holding all other variables at
central values, and with Diaspora size interacted with ethnic dominance set at 0.209 (75th
percentile), increasing ethnic dominance from 0 to 1 results in a 5.1% decrease in the likelihood
of peacebuilding success.39 Furthermore, with Diaspora size interacted with ethnic dominance
set at 0.209 (75th percentile), and religious dominance and its interaction both set at 0, holding
all other variables at central values, increasing ethnic dominance from 0 to 1 results in a 3.5%
decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success. Therefore, ethnic dominance, in the
absence of religious dominance and combined with moderate Diaspora size, lowers the
likelihood of peacebuilding success by 3.5%.

Holding all other variables at central values, and with Diaspora size interacted with ethnic
dominance set at 0.209 (75th percentile), Diaspora size interacted with religious dominance set
at 0.464 (75th percentile), and religious dominance set at 1, increasing ethnic dominance from 0
to 1 results in a 5.1% decrease in the chances of peacebuilding success. These results indicate
that when ethnic dominance is combined with religious dominance and a moderate Diaspora
size, the probability of peacebuilding success decreases by 5.1%.

When ethnic dominance increases from 0 to 1, with Diaspora size set at 2.844 (90th percentile),
its interaction with ethnic dominance set at 2.844 (90th percentile), and religious dominance
39

th

The 75 percentile was chosen because approximately 50% of the cases exhibit ethnic dominance, thereby
th
making the 75 percentile around the mid-range for the cases that exhibit ethnic dominance.
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and its interaction both set at 0, holding all other variables at central values, the probability of
peacebuilding success decreases by 6.2%. These results suggest that ethnic dominance, in the
absence of religious dominance and combined with a large Diaspora size, correspond with a
6.2% decrease in the likelihood of peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 10. Ethnic Dominance, Religious Dominance & Diaspora Size
Ethnic dominance interacted with Diaspora size does not follow the predicted direction and is
never significant. Similarly, Religious dominance interacted with Diaspora size is also not
significant in any of the models, however, its coefficient alternates directions. None of the
models show ethnic and religious dominance interacted with Diaspora size to have a significant
relationship with peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 11. Previous Experience with Political Pluralism
The two proxies for previous experience with political pluralism both follow the predicted
positive direction, however, only the democracy score is significant. The democracy score is
positive and significant in 3 of the 4 models thereby suggesting that more experience with
political pluralism corresponds with a greater likelihood of peacebuilding success. Increasing
democracy from 0.820 (50th percentile) to 16.240 (90th percentile) results in a 4.2% increase in
the probability of peacebuilding success, with all other variables held at central values.
Moreover, if democracy is increased from 0 to 31 (99th percentile), the likelihood of
peacebuilding success increases by a drastic 35.2%.40 These figures indicate that democracy

40

Increasing democracy from 25 to 31 increases the likelihood of peacebuilding success by 0.137, or 13.7%.
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does noticeably increase the chances of peacebuilding success and countries that reach the 99th
percentile radically heighten their chances of peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 12. Deaths & Displacements
As predicted, greater war-related deaths and displacements negatively correlate with the
probability of peacebuilding success and is significant in all 8 models. Holding all other
variables at central values, the most drastic effect of deaths and displacements occurs when
increased from 8.385 (1st percentile) to 11.197 (10th percentile), which corresponds with a 4.6%
decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success. Increasing accumulated deaths and
displacements from 11.547 (25th percentile) to 13.384 (75th percentile) decreases the likelihood
of peacebuilding success by a mere 1.3%. Due to large variance, the natural log of deaths and
displacements is used in this analysis. These results suggest that a relatively small number of
deaths and displacements, say around 4,380 (1st percentile), has a much smaller effect on the
probability of peacebuilding success than say around 72,911 (10th percentile). Once a conflict
has accumulated approximately 72,911 deaths and displacements, any additional deaths and
displacements has a relatively small affect on the probability of peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 13. War Duration
Contradicting the predicted direction, war duration proves to be significant in all models and to
negatively correlate with peacebuilding success. As previously discussed, war duration could be
argued either way. If war duration is changed from 1.609 (10th percentile) to 5.288 (90th
percentile) the likelihood of peacebuilding success moderately decreases by 0.035, with all
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other variables held at central values. These results suggest that longer wars create
environments less favorable for peacebuilding success. Although this could seem puzzling given
the results of hypothesis 12, longer wars also correspond with more embedded war economies
and longer exposure to a culture of impunity, both of which theoretically correspond with a
lower likelihood of peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 14. Identity Wars
Identity wars proved to be negative and significant in all of the 8 models. Holding all other
variables at central values, ethnoreligious wars decrease the probability of peacebuilding
success by 0.035, or 3.5%. This suggests that ethnic and religious wars are less conducive to
peacebuilding success.

HYPOTHESIS 15. Signed Peace Treaty
The presence of a signed peace treaty proves to be positive and significant in 3 of the 8 models
(e.g. Models 5, 6, and 8). The probability of peacebuilding success increases by 0.035 when a
war has ended with a signed peace treaty, with all other variables held at central values.

HYPOTHESIS 16. UN Mandate
The presence of a UN peace operation does not prove to be significant by itself or when
interacted with signed peace treaty.
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New Local Capacity Indexes
Using the results from the 8 logistic models, 8 local capacities indexes were created and tested
(see Appendix E). The chosen local capacities index is shown in Model 7. All three indexes
prove to be significant and all of the coefficients follow their expected directions.41 The model
correctly classifies 82.91% of the cases.42 In comparison to Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) local
capacities index (mean: 0.095; variance: 0.023), the new local capacities index has a slightly
larger mean of 0.132 and variance of 0.031.

Both of the rural population density local capacities indexes excluding the probability of
intrastate conflict dimension prove to be significant, correctly classifying 76.27% and 78.81% of
the cases; however, the percent urban population local capacities index excluding the
probability of intrastate conflict dimension is insignificant (see Models 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix
F). Therefore, the probability of intrastate conflict dimension improves the percent correctly
classified by 6.64% and 4.10%. None of the local capacities indexes excluding the propensity for
democratization dimension are significant, which suggests that propensity for democratization
is an important dimension of the local capacities index (see Models 4 and 5 in Appendix F).
Furthermore, the local capacities index excluding the socioeconomic endowment dimension is
significant, correctly classifying 75.63% of the cases (see Model 6 in Appendix F). The
socioeconomic endowment dimension improves the percent correctly classified by 7.28%.
These results suggest that, though excluding two of the three local capacities dimensions does

41

Although Model 3 has a slightly lower log pseudo-likelihood ratio (e.g. -55.988), its mean (e.g. 0.086) and
variance (e.g. 0.016) are actually slightly lower than Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) index.
42
Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) model correctly classifies 80.17% of the cases.

43
not make the local capacities index insignificant, including all three dimensions does prove to
make the strongest local capacities index (e.g. with the best percentage correctly classified,
82.91%).

The purpose of the new local capacities index is to better capture the dynamics of the domestic
realm with respect to building peace. The new local capacities index should better depict the
realities of the domestic post-conflict terrain thereby improving the predictability of the
peacebuilding triangle model in addition to shedding light on the relationship between
domestic politics and peace. Theoretically, cases that exhibit a relatively high level of
socioeconomic development, the sole variable of Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) local capacities
index, while also displaying some of the negative factors that contribute to civil war onset,
should be better represented by the new local capacities index and peacebuilding model. This
analysis will explore a few examples of cases that should be better captured by the new local
capacities index in order to see if the index enhances its accuracy where expected.
Acknowledging that these examples do not serve as in depth case studies, this analysis uses
these examples as a basic test and nothing more.

This analysis includes three civil wars in Angola between the UNITA and the government. As a
result of Angola’s relatively higher level of electricity consumption per capita, all three of the
civil wars were classified by Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) as having a local capacities level
between the 25th and 50th percentile, meaning that Angola is considered to have more
domestic capacity for building peace than approximately 25% to 50% of the cases. Angola has
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an especially problematic environment for building peace because of its high natural resource
dependency (99th percentile), significant lootable resource endowment and relatively high rural
population density (50th percentile), and zero previous experience with political pluralism.
Therefore, the expected new local capacities level would be considerably lower than Sambanis
and Doyle’s (2006) local capacities index would depict. The new local capacities index
measures the three Angolan post-conflict environments at around the 10th percentile, meaning
that Angola’s domestic capacity for building peace is lower than around 90% of the cases.
Furthermore, the new local capacities index predicts the probability of peacebuilding success to
be 15%, 34% and 34% in comparison to Sambanis and Doyle’s prediction of 22%, 43%, and
42%.43 In this case, it seems that the new local capacities index portrays a more accurate
depiction of the domestic capacity for building peace.

Iraq is another case with a difficult post-conflict environment and a higher level of
socioeconomic development (90th percentile). Sambanis and Doyle (2006) measured Iraq’s
local capacities level to be around the 90th percentile, which indicates that Iraq has greater
domestic capacity for building peace than approximately 90% of the cases included in this
analysis. Iraq’s post-conflict environment is particularly problematic because of its extremely
low rural population density (5th to 10th percentile), the presence of ethnic dominance, its
relatively moderate Diaspora size (25th to 50th percentile), and its lack of previous experience
with political pluralism. Low rural population density is unfavorable to peacebuilding success

43

These figures are listed in chronological order, with the first war beginning in 1975 and ending in 1991, the
second war existing between 1992 and 1994, and the final war beginning in 1997 and lasting until 2002.
Moreover, the results of Model 3 determine the probability of peacebuilding success to be 0.17, 0.35, and 0.35.
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because it tends to coincide with greater rural population dispersion, thereby making the
broadcast of state power a laborious task. Furthermore, Iraq has an incredibly high
dependence on natural resource rents (0.273, which falls between the 75th and 90th percentiles)
which falls closely to what Collier (2007) identifies as the most precarious level of natural
resource dependency, 26%. The new local capacities index predicts the probability of
peacebuilding success to between 0.06 and 0.10, which seems more accurate in comparison to
Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) prediction of between 0.17 and 0.23.44

44

The figures are listed in chronological order, with the first war existing from 1974 to 1975, the second war
beginning in 1985 and ending in 1996, and the final war lasting from 1991 to 1993. Furthermore, the results of
Model 3 determine the probability of peacebuilding success to be between 0.07 and 0.12.
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7. CONCLUSION

All of the three dimensions – socioeconomic endowment, probability of intrastate conflict, and
propensity for democratization – do influence the probability of building post-conflict peace.
Under the socioeconomic endowment dimension, the two state power proxies, rural
population density and percent urban population, proved to be both significant in their
respective models; however, rural population density is positively correlated with
peacebuilding success while percent urban population is negatively correlated with
peacebuilding success. Additionally, two of the socioeconomic endowment proxies, electricity
consumption per capita and rural population density interacted with electricity consumption
per capita, proved to be significant in their expected directions for the rural population density
models.45 Several of the proxies of the probability of intrastate conflict dimension proved to be
significant. First, natural resource dependency and oil dependency were both negative and
significant in their respective models. Second, Diaspora size also proved to be negative and
significant. In contrast to the predicted direction, lootable resource endowment proved to be
positive and significant in all of the models. Nevertheless, lootable resource endowment
interacted with rural population density proved to be negative and significant, as expected.
These results could mean that lootable resources are only problematic when they are outside
of the realm of state power; otherwise, lootable resource endowment actually enhances the
prospects for building peace. Fifth, although ethnic fractionalization and religious
fractionalization did not prove to be significant independently, religious fractionalization
45

Percent urban population interacted with electricity consumption per capita did not prove to be significant in
any of the models.
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interacted with electricity consumption per capita did prove to be negative and significant, as
predicted. Sixth, ethnic dominance proved to be negative and significant. Under the final local
capacities dimension, propensity for democratization, the democracy score measure proved to
be positive and significant.

Several implications can be derived from the results of this analysis pertaining to the broader
question concerning what peacebuilders can do to maximize the prospect of peace. First,
securing and building up the rural domain is of the utmost importance. Whether one argues
that low rural population density is problematic because it allows insurgents to live outside the
realm of state power, or if one chooses to argue that low rural population density is
problematic because it captures the inability of the rural domain to sustain populations, or
provide populations with basic physical security, the conclusion is the same. Peacebuilders
should focus on building physical infrastructure – creating channels of communication and
transportation between the rural periphery and the urban centers – in the rural hinterland.
Second, peacebuilders can improve the prospect of peace by increasing exposure to political
pluralism. Moreover, for countries with considerable Diaspora, peacebuilders should focus on
Diaspora inclusion in the peace process. Lastly, for countries endowed with lootable resources,
peacebuilders should focus on securing these resources from insurgent control. In general,
peace is unlikely when rebels have access to lucrative revenue sources and when the state is
unable to monopolize the legitimate use of force.
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Adding dimensions to the local capacities index does improve the overall predictability of the
peacebuilding triangle model. Moreover, the new local capacities index does seem to better
portray the cases theoretically expected to be improved by the new index. More in depth case
study comparison is required in order to determine the precise extent to which the local
capacities index captures the domestic capacity for peace. This analysis shows how confining
the domestic realm to a single measure of socioeconomic development overlooks the complex
relationship between domestic qualities and peace.
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MODEL TWO

MODEL ONE

Appendix A: Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) Indexes
Hostility Index
war type

Local Capacities Index
International Capacities Index
electricity consumption per capita interaction between the type of
UN mandate and signed peace
treaty

log of deaths and displacements
war duration
war type

per capita GDP

log of deaths and displacements

rate of growth of per capita GDP

war duration

primary commodity exports as a
percent of GDP

interaction between the type of
UN mandate and signed peace
treaty
net current transfers to the
balance of payments

MODEL THREE

number of factions
war type

per capita GDP

log of deaths and displacements

rate of growth of per capita GDP

war duration

primary commodity exports as a
percent of GDP (*different
imputation of missing values)

interaction between the type of
UN mandate and signed peace
treaty
net current transfers to the
balance of payments
index of the troops strength of
the UN mission

Control Variables:
(1) decade war started; (2) cold war conflict; (3) geographic region; (4) military personnel (in thousands, at the
end of the war of closest year)
Note:
Sambanis and Doyle (2006) also explored the a measure of oil exports greater than 30% of GDP as part of the local
capacities index.
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
MEAN
0.659

MEDIAN
1.000

ST.DEV
0.475

RANGE
1.000

VARIANCE
0.225

3.536

3.761

1.417

6.169

2.010

12.392

11.913

1.317

7.059

1.734

unman

0.781

0.000

1.423

5.000

2.025

treaty

0.306

0.000

0.462

1.000

0.213

treaty.unman

0.530

0.000

1.245

5.000

1.552

cold war

0.688

1.000

0.464

1.000

0.215

army*

4.410

3.912

1.840

8.575

3.386

safrica

0.344

0.000

0.476

1.000

0.227

elect

6.069

2.200

9.827

53.770

96.584

r.density

3.989

2.623

7.330

79.377

53.736

elect.r.den

4.172

0.510

10.609

79.304

112.563

34.270

31.378

19.894

88.620

395.772

263.426

44.356

571.170

4896.327

326236.000

nr.depend

0.164

0.113

0.186

1.011

0.034

oil.depend

0.205

0.000

0.405

1.000

0.164

loot.r.den

0.930

0.000

1.716

6.862

2.947

loot

0.311

0.000

0.464

1.000

0.215

eth.frac

0.503

0.551

0.297

0.897

0.088

rel.frac

0.410

0.445

0.211

0.782

0.044

war
duration*
deaths.disp*

u.pop
u.pop.elect
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics (continued)

eth.dom

MEAN
0.517

MEDIAN
1.000

ST.DEV
0.501

RANGE
1.000

VARIANCE
0.251

rel.dom

0.743

1.000

0.438

1.000

0.192

diaspora

1.047

0.121

1.317

4.933

1.736

eth.frac.elect

1.956

0.806

3.355

28.183

11.258

rel.frac.elect

1.901

0.646

3.664

28.676

13.427

diasp.e.dom

0.567

0.002

1.128

4.933

1.274

diasp.r.dom

0.672

0.023

1.180

4.933

1.393

democracy

4.837

0.820

7.228

32.100

52.253

17.823

14.350

17.480

60.350

305.584

participation

Note: * indicates log transformation.
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Appendix C: Logit Regression Models
MODEL 1.
-1.401
[0.527]
-0.567
duration*
0.252]
-0.629
deaths.disp*
[0.364]
-0.683
unman
[0.887]
1.206
treaty
[0.838]
treaty.unman
1.860
[1.324]
cold war
0.307
[0.962]
0.081
army*
[0.389]
-0.367
safrica
[0.971]
0.345
electricity
[0.126]
0.152
r.density
[0.128]
-0.116
elect.r.den
[0.048]
u.pop
war

MODEL 2.
-1.185
[0.571]
-0.473
[0.239]
-0.789
[0.377]
-0.463
[0.720]
1.370
[0.867]
1.541
[1.120]
0.145
[0.839]
0.275
0.408]
-0.445
[1.001]
0.365
[0.106]
0.210
[0.089]
-0.086
[0.033]

u.pop.elect
nr.depend

-13.071
[3.809]

oil.depend
loot.r.den
loot
eth.frac
rel.frac
eth.dom
rel.dom
diaspora

-1.100
[0.234]
2.565
[1.248]
-1.069
[1.992]
1.890
[3.914]
-1.767
[0.958]
0.412
[0.735]
-1.351
[0.692]

-3.229
[0.711]
-1.200
[0.304]
2.639
[1.005]
-1.808
[1.979]
1.488
[3.666]
-2.004
[0.966]
0.729
[0.632]
-1.279
[0.589]

MODEL 3.
-1.537
0.535]
-0.460
[0.237]
-0.626
[0.361]
-0.671
[0.972]
1.140
[0.873]
1.748
[1.347]
-0.335
[0.886]
-0.078
[0.334]
-0.556
[1.067]
0.274
[0.176]

MODEL 4.
-1.601
[0.588]
-0.387
[0.209]
-0.813
[0.358]
-0.370
[0.777]
1.311
[0.846]
1.345
[1.096]
-0.586
[0.827]
0.128
[0.292]
-0.570
[1.062]
0.237
[0.149]

-0.033
[0.018]
-0.001
[0.001]
-12.462
[3.505]

-0.045
[0.018]
0.000
[0.001]

-0.582
[0.241]
0.930
[1.155]
-0.407
[1.958]
-0.008
[3.679]
-1.829
[0.958]
0.806
[0.803]
-0.981
[0.573]

MODEL 5.
-1.631
[0.576]
-0.580
[0.259]
-0.686
[0.361]
-0.590
[0.858]
1.467
[0.810]
1.754
[1.294]
0.827
[0.972]
0.009
[0.335]
-0.699
[1.011]
0.330
[0.132]
0.233
[0.109]
-0.109
[0.051]

MODEL 6.
-1.365
[0.611]
-0.493
[0.255]
-0.803
[0.365]
-0.365
[0.632]
1.592
[0.833]
1.413
[1.023]
0.383
[0.809]
0.232
[0.354]
-0.712
[1.059]
0.334
[0.116]
0.248
[0.077]
-0.077
[0.030]

-13.907
[4.636]
-2.637
[0.652]
-0.674
[0.286]
1.068
[1.039]
-1.331
[2.246]
-0.762
[3.743]
-2.058
[1.020]
0.991
[0.694]
-0.996
[0.551]

-1.035
[0.233]
2.270
[1.227]
-0.624
[1.738]
2.034
[3.452]
-1.936
[0.976]
0.207
[0.708]
-1.647
[0.775]

-3.290
[0.708]
-1.091
[0.269]
2.296
[1.126]
-1.359
[1.904]
1.374
[3.217]
-1.951
[0.978]
0.616
[0.596]
-1.438
[0.624]

MODEL 7.
-1.869
[0.611]
-0.461
[0.235]
-0.665
[0.354]
-0.629
[0.985]
1.327
[0.909]
1.686
[1.365]
0.117
[0.769]
-0.193
[0.296]
-1.118
[1.114]
0.229
[0.177]

MODEL 8.
-1.787
[0.671]
-0.393
[0.219]
-0.838
[0.357]
-0.362
[0.789]
1.371
[0.820]
1.330
[1.124]
-0.313
[0.776]
0.042
[0.265]
-1.054
[1.119]
0.210
[0.161]

-0.037
[0.019]
-0.001
[0.001]
-13.205
[3.839]

-0.046
[0.018]
0.000
[0.001]

-0.458
[0.226]
0.423
[1.070]
-0.013
[1.812]
0.460
[3.068]
-1.871
[0.903]
0.606
[0.801]
-1.287
[0.545]

-2.708
[0.593]
-0.540
[0.245]
0.618
[0.996]
-0.913
[2.144]
-0.514
[3.276]
-1.950
[0.980]
0.868
[0.715]
-1.206
[0.517]
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Appendix C: Logit Regression Models (continued)

e.frac.elect
r.frac.elect
diasp.e.dom
diasp.r.dom
democracy

MODEL 1.
0.328
[0.355]
-0.907
[0.447]
0.399
[0.950]
0.451
[1.009]
0.136
[0.076]

MODEL 2.
0.217
[0.244]
-0.939
[0.400]
0.516
[1.158]
0.131
[1.210]
0.113
[0.075]

MODEL 3.
0.258
[0.395]
-0.614
[0.375]
0.895
[1.028]
-0.262
[0.798]
0.158
[0.053]

MODEL 4.
0.189
[0.332]
-0.645
[0.410]
1.111
[1.102]
-0.514
[0.879]
0.141
[0.059]

MODEL 5.
0.406
[0.375]
-0.729
[0.393]
0.391
[0.768]
0.789
[0.935]

MODEL 6.
0.264
[0.386]
-0.729
[0.318]
0.511
[1.059]
0.301
[1.141]

MODEL 7.
0.361
[0.342]
-0.373
[0.308]
0.832
[0.799]
0.077
[0.698]

MODEL 8.
0.222
[0.386]
-0.374
[0.330]
1.086
[0.956]
-0.319
[0.804]

0.013
[0.021]
9.720
[5.171]

0.033
[0.020]
12.655
[5.576]

0.021
[0.022]
13.959
[5.304]

116
0.473
-36.928
86.21
58.06

116
0.461
-37.805
87.93
46.69

116
0.444
-38.970
85.34
41.36

constant

9.529
[5.591]

9.506
[5.631]

11.803
[5.539]

13.357
[5.202]

0.025
[0.022]
10.018
[5.600]

N
Pseudo-R2
P-Log-L
% CC
% ROE

116
0.530
-32.974
89.66
62.52

116
0.520
-33.651
88.79
58.06

116
0.500
-35.036
88.79
54.55

116
0.491
-35.693
88.79
53.34

116
0.492
-35.614
87.07
58.06

participation

Reported: coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses); estimates in bold are significant at least at the 0.05 level
with two-tailed test; estimates in italics are significant at the 0.10 level; * indicates log transformation.
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Appendix D: Individual Dimension Logit Regression Models

war
duration*
deaths.disp*
unman
treaty
treaty.unman
cold war
army*
safrica
elect
r.density
elect.r.den
nr.depend
loot.r.den
loot
eth.frac
rel.frac
eth.dom
rel.dom
diaspora

MODEL 1.
-1.309
[0.477]
-0.292
[0.186]
-0.673
[0.277]
-0.104
[0.496]
0.981
[0.753]
0.812
[0.666]
0.671
[0.669]
0.096
[0.167]
0.288
[0.744]
0.101
[0.038]
0.073
[0.064]
-0.039
[0.014]

MODEL 2.
-1.626
[0.553]
-0.611
[0.255]
-0.706
[0.382]
-0.527
[0.788]
1.517
[0.816]
1.730
[1.239]
0.764
[0.980]
-0.006
[0.355]
-0.284
[0.968]
0.316
[0.129]
0.294
[0.089]
-0.094
[0.039]
-12.205
[3.284]
-0.979
[0.220]
2.228
[1.305]
-0.509
[1.739]
0.913
[3.343]
-1.830
[0.953]
0.311
[0.709]
-1.520
[0.664]

MODEL 3.
-1.612
[0.561]
-0.423
[0.240]
-0.529
[0.287]
-0.407
[0.624]
1.027
[0.798]
1.386
[0.880]
-0.100
[0.842]
-0.126
[0.341]
-0.264
[0.941]

-13.697
[3.321]
-0.590
[0.220]
1.147
[1.090]
-1.499
[2.039]
-0.157
[3.505]
-1.881
[0.970]
0.340
[0.713]
-1.320
[0.640]
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Appendix D: Individual Dimension Logit Regression Models (continued)
MODEL 1.

0.051
[0.038]
6.657
[3.754]

10.437
[6.039]

MODEL 3.
0.534
[0.398]
-0.385
[0.316]
0.779
[1.005]
0.125
[0.841]
0.137
[0.054]
10.924
[4.725]

117
0.253
26.450
-53.349
84.62
28.02

116
0.516
114.030
-33.963
88.79
58.06

116
0.459
89.190
-37.943
86.21
50.01

eth.frac.elect
rel.frac.elect
diasp.e.dom
diasp.r.dom
democracy
constant

N
Pseudo-R2
Wald Statistic
P-Log-L
%CC
%ROE

MODEL 2.
0.418
[0.376]
-0.651
[0.379]
0.367
[0.821]
0.677
[0.907]

Reported: coefficents and robust standard errors (in
parantheses); estimates in bold are significant at least at the
0.05 level with two-tailed test; estimates in italics are
significant at the 0.10 level; * indicates log transformation.
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Appendix E: Index Logit Regression Models

hostility
local 1.
local 2.
local 3.
local 4.
local 5.
local 6.
local 7.
local 8.
international
_con

N
Pseudo-R2
Wald Statistic
P-Log-L
% CC

MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3. MODEL 4. MODEL 5. MODEL 6. MODEL 7. MODEL 8.
-3.795
-4.082
-3.881
-4.096
-3.985
-4.061
-4.279
-4.167
[1.274]
[1.263]
[1.283]
[1.263]
[1.253]
[1.273]
[1.290]
[1.250]
0.430
[0.227]
0.058
[0.036]
0.870
[0.368]
0.046
[0.028]
0.278
[0.335]
0.280
[0.238]
1.059
[0.462]
0.503
[0.379]
2.931
2.904
3.105
2.908
2.802
2.848
3.087
2.964
[0.980]
[1.008]
[0.955]
[1.004]
[0.970]
[0.978]
[0.961]
[0.953]
0.238
0.702
0.064
0.732
0.580
0.582
0.335
0.554
[0.637]
[0.586]
[0.600]
[0.581]
[0.606]
[0.606]
[0.577]
[0.582]
117
0.157
16.59
-60.141
76.92

117
0.138
14.81
-61.482
78.63

117
0.215
19.64
-55.988
80.34

117
0.140
14.92
-61.357
79.49

117
0.132
14.62
-61.91
78.63

117
0.138
14.68
-61.512
78.63

117
0.201
17.51
-57.004
82.91

117
0.170
16.79
-59.202
82.05

Reported: coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses); bold indicates significance at least at the 0.05
level with two-tailed test; italics indicates signficance at the 0.10 level.
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Appendix F: Index Individual Dimension Logit Regression Models

hostility
local 1.

MODEL 1.
-3.781
[1.236]
7.131
[2.057]

local 2.

MODEL 2.
-3.831
[1.218]

MODEL 3.
-4.035
[1.230]

MODEL 4.
-3.819
[1.228]

MODEL 5.
-3.896
[1.228]

6.37
[2.118]

local 3.

3.548
[2.518]

local 4.

1.337
[1.281]

local 5.

0.393
[0.732]

local 6.
international
_con

N
Pseudo-R2
Wald Statistic
P-Log-L
%CC

MODEL 6.
-3.454
[1.290]

2.782
[1.008]
0.473
[0.551]

2.865
[0.991]
0.507
[0.543]

2.929
[0.960]
0.493
[0.584]

2.797
[0.973]
0.527
[0.616]

2.756
[0.967]
0.707
[0.595]

5.377
[2.934]
2.407
[0.933]
0.257
[0.634]

118
0.166
18.23
-60.534
76.27

118
0.166
18.39
-60.509
78.81

119
0.152
15.89
-61.822
80.67

117
0.133
15.73
-61.827
76.07

117
0.126
14.84
-62.366
76.07

119
0.139
12.96
-62.797
75.63

Reported: coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses); bold indicates significance at
least at the 0.05 level with two-tailed test; italics indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

